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Abstract
With the rise of misinformation epidemic, this study
aims to empirically investigate the consequences of an
online commenting platform’s activity-capping policy
on abusers’ and regular users’ activities. Utilizing a
quasi-experimental setting, we find that restrictive
policies not only curtail the activity of the abusers but
also promote the activity of regular users. Results show
that the policy has an asymmetric effect on abusers and
regular users— while it effectively reduces the actions
of the malicious users by 1.8%, it promotes the activities
of the regular users by 2.2%. To better understand the
behavioral change of the regular users, we draw from
the rational economic perspective of voting decisions
and provide initial evidence that such policy measures
reinforce the subjective probability of being influential
on the outcome. This study will provide valuable
implications to managers and policymakers to estimate
the consequences of and to combat against malicious
behaviors and to promote free speech in online
platforms.

1. Introduction
With the emergence of online communicating
platforms, people share and gather information from the
web. While it has allowed the social actors to directly
exchange their opinions at a little to no cost [20], at the
same time, it has also allowed the malicious actors to
spread false information quickly to sway the public's
views on specific topics [23]. False information and
politically-biased misinformation on online platforms
have engendered unprecedented economic and political
problems throughout the world [12].
As a mean to control the quality of the contents and
to dilute the spread of misinformation, many online
platforms have introduced a way to aggregate opinion –
with upvoting and downvoting on posts and comments
[22]. For example, Reddit offers its users to
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upvote/downvote on posts and comments, and its
relative votes determine the visibility of the posts. Such
a system improves “digital democracy” [22], but at the
same time, it provides opportunities for malicious users
to disseminate information without much friction by
utilizing upvote/downvote bots and sockpuppets. As
Muchnik et al. (2013) found, prior rating on
comments/posts significantly affects how people
perceive and rate [18]. Thus, attempts to manipulate
public opinion using upvotes/downvotes have become a
severe issue to online platforms and their users.
One straightforward solution for the online
platforms to fight the misinformation by manipulating
the popularity of postings is to place restrictions on how
frequently, easily, and quickly a user influences the
popularity of the information. Some platforms have
already adopted such restrictive policy measures that do
not discriminate between abuser and regular users. For
instance, WhatsApp introduced a message-forwarding
cap, that users can only share a message up to five times,
to curb the overly fast distribution of misinformation
[8]. Recent scholarly work demonstrates that setting a
limit on political URLs shared in Twitter effectively
reduces the fake news spread [7].
Although an activity cap may help online platforms
regain social accountability, it may affect the activity
and traffic levels accrued by users and thus the profit of
the platforms. As the capping policy symmetrically
affects both abusers and regular users, it is plausible that
the capping policy not only reduces the malicious
actions but also reduces the activity levels of regular
users. As the activity and traffic levels accrued by users
are one of the essential metrics for the platform’s profit,
it is vital to understand the full ramifications of policy
interventions by examining its impact on the malicious
users and the regular users. That is, we aim to
investigate the efficacy of such policy measures in
restraining malicious activities as well as in suppressing,
or even bolstering, the regular users' activities.
While scholarly work in online opinion
manipulation is growing, current literature focuses on
the spread of misinformation and discusses ways to
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restrain malicious activities. Only a handful of studies
show the platform’s policy on regular users. For
example, Ma and Agarwal (2007) found that identity
verification, a form of platform’s abuser-restraining
measure, increases users’ satisfaction and knowledge
sharing [16]. However, their work is based on the survey
data and did not delve into its potential impact on
regular users. Also, Grinberg et al. (2019) showed the
effectiveness of setting a limit on political URLs in
Twitter on fake news spread, but it was based on a
simulation [7]. To our best knowledge, no study to date
has empirically examined the consequences of an online
commenting platform’s capping policy on regular users’
activities. This study aims to fill that void by attributing
the efficacy of the online platform’s policy measure to
meaningful behavioral changes of regular users.
We empirically investigate the consequences of a
deterrence policy on regular users by utilizing a natural
quasi-experiment setting. To this end, we collaborated
with one of the largest online platforms in East Asia.
The platform implemented a deterrence policy during
our sample period by restricting the number of
comments and the count of upvotes and downvotes a
user can cast. We exploit this institutional variation to
make inferences about the effects of the deterrence
policy on both abusers and regular users, utilizing
individual-level log data before and after the policy
implementation.
Results show some interesting findings. First, policy
implementation positively affects the overall activities
of the voting activities. Second, the policy has an
asymmetric effect on abusive users and regular users –
while it effectively reduces the actions of the malicious
users by 1.8%, it promotes the activities of the general
users by 2.2%. Third, the policy increases the activities
of the regular users, regardless of their previous voting
activities. While the policy shows stronger effect on
increasing the users with previous voting activities, it
also effectively attracts users without any voting
activities to engage in the voting behavior.
Further, to better understand underlying mechanism
driving regular users’ behavioral changes, we draw
upon the rational economic perspective of voting
decisions by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) [19], and posit
that the utility of expressing their liking or disliking on
a given opinion (i.e., comment) as a function of the
subjective probability of being able to influence the
popularity of that opinion by up-voting or down-voting
it, respectively. Based on the fact that a preemptive
measure against malicious actors employed by a
platform is likely reinforce, if not strengthen, the belief
that the voice of regular users will be heard and
represented accurately due to the expected decrease of
abusive behaviors in the platform. We support our
hypothesis by finding some initial evidence that the

capping policy reinforces the subjective probability of
being influential on the outcome in the upvote actions.
Our results contribute to the extant literature of fake
information and online opinion manipulation and our
understanding of policy measures to restrain the
manipulative activities. Reports from the social network
platforms and popular press have documented the
potential consequences of such a restrictive policy on
the dissemination of the fake information. Our study
focuses on another yet important outcome of such a
restrictive policy on the regular users’ activity levels.
Our results indicate that the platform's simple input
capping policy suppresses only the activities of the
abusers and instead increases the activities of the regular
users by strengthening the belief that the voice of regular
users will be heard and represented accurately due to the
expected decrease of abusive behaviors in the platform.
Further, our research provides meaningful managerial
insights into the online platforms.

2. Opinion manipulation in online platform
Online manipulation has received significant
attention from researchers since the emergence of online
communicating platforms. With the proliferation of the
online platforms which enable sharing of the usergenerated contents, concerns on malicious action and its
impact on the people's behavior have brought scholarly
attention in the field. The extant literature on online
manipulation focuses on product reviews by
investigating notable characteristics of fake reviews [1],
detecting fake reviews [3, 9, 11], and examining the
consequences of the malicious review activities and
devising potential solutions to suppress deceptive
reviews [14 ,17]. For example, Anderson and Simester
(2014) find that fake reviews are more negative and
contain less explanation about the products [1]. Fake
review detection research focuses on the formulation of
detection algorithms, leveraging reviewer information,
review quality and product attributes [9], reviewer
characteristics and interactions among them [11], and
linguistic cues in the review contents [3]. Lastly, a few
studies have documented potential solution to combat
deceptive reviews. Mayzlin et al. (2014) found that
significantly less malicious reviews exist under the
platform with a verified reviewer feature [17]. Also,
Lappas et al. (2016) investigates the impact of malicious
reviews on the ranking of the business shown in the
platform and provides potential response strategies for
the attacked business owners [14].
Another stream of literature on online manipulation
focuses on the spread of misinformation in the social
media and commenting platforms and its consequences.
A rich set of research focus on the malicious actions of
social and political bots in social media [5, 10], the
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impact of the manipulative information [21, 23], and
how people react to the mal-information [2, 18].
Kollanyi et al. (2016) analyze tweets generated during
the 2016 US presidential election and find that
automated activities accounts reached up to 27% at its
peak [10]. Forelle et al. (2014) investigated activities of
political bots in Venezuela and finds that only a small
number of bots generate a high volume of retweets [5].
Vosoughi et al. (2018) examine the spread of false news
and find that news with misinformation spreads further
and faster than the true news [23]. Shao et al. (2018) find
that automated bots are the leading cause of false
information spread on Twitter [21]. And lastly, some
papers look into the consequences of manipulated
information and automated activities. In their 2013
paper, Muchnik et al. find that positively biased
opinions generate positive herding effect while
negatively biased opinions get people to correct the bias
[18]. Also, Badawy et al. (2018) find evidence that users
are vulnerable to malicious activities. People helped to
share tweets from Russian trolls during the 2016
election [2].
While the negative consequences of online
manipulation have been well noted by previous
literature, little research has addressed the strategies to
mitigate this negative impact. As noted previously, a
few studies discuss the effectiveness of user verification
on malicious activities [17] and deterrence policies [7].
However, the literature focuses on the impact of such
policy measures on abuser activities and misinformation
spread. Only a handful of studies examined the
consequences of deterring mechanisms on regular users’
behavior. Ma and Agarwal (2007) find that identity
verification of the content generator increases users'
satisfaction and knowledge sharing [16]. However, their
work is based on the survey data from the users from the
online communities. To our knowledge, no study to date
has empirically examined the consequences of such
policies on regular users. As more platforms have
adopted strategies to combat malicious actions,
practitioners need to understand the impact of these
strategies on non-malicious users as the volume
generated by the users is directly linked to the firm
profit. Thus, more scholarly attention to this topic is
needed.

3. Conceptual framework
In this study, we aim to empirically investigate the
effect of the online commenting platform's deterring
mechanism on regular user activities. Expressly, our
focal policy targets to limit the volume and the
frequency of activities from malicious accounts by
imposing a restriction of the total number of activities
per account and adds ten-second intermittent pauses or

delays between activities (e.g., commenting, up-voting,
down-voting). The pause implemented would
effectively reduce the activities of the automated bots,
and the restriction on the total number of activities
would force attackers to put extra effort and time to
make more accounts if they want to engage in the
malicious activities of high volume. Hence, our focal
policy is expected to ramp up the friction to malicious
users thus deterring their activities, but at the same time
it can give rise to either the same level of suppression of
activity restriction towards regular users or potential
encouragement to regular users to more engage in the
platform for the increased authority provided under the
manipulation deterrence initiative. Thus the
multifaceted role of the coercive focal policy remains
still unanswered.

3.1. The calculus of voting
According to the voting decision model developed
by Riker and Ordeshook (1968), an individual’s
decision to vote is determined by the following trade-off
involving four factors:
P×B+D>C
where P stands for the subjective probability of
casting a vote that is pivotal to the election outcome, B
means perceived benefit one would get if the supporting
candidate wins, D as the personal satisfaction a voter
would gain from participating in an election, and C
representing the cost and effort associated with voting.
In the context of random utility maximization
framework, an individual’s decision on whether or not
to engage in voting depends on the expected benefit the
individual would get from the action and the cost
associated with it. Accordingly, a voter would decide to
vote only if the expected utility (probability x benefit +
satisfaction from participation) is higher than the cost
associated with voting [19].
We apply this theoretical framework to our
research context. Similar to the election turnout, users in
our focal platform determine whether or not to
participate in the voting activity based on the four
factors above. As our goal of this research is to see the
impact of the platform policy on the user activities, we
assume that B and D are fixed – the perceived benefit of
promoting/demoting a comment and the benefit from
participating in the commenting system would not
change before and after the platform policy
implementation. We assume that the benefits one would
get from promoting/demoting a comment roots from the
comment itself, such as contents and quality of the
comment. Similarly, satisfaction from participation
depends on the personal characteristics of the regular
user. As we have little to believe that the policy change
is affecting these root causes of both factors, we focus
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primarily on the remaining two factors – the perceived
probability of casting a decisive vote and the cost
associated with voting to develop our hypothesis. We
first examine the cost posited from the policy
intervention and then look at the change in the
subjective probability of casting a decisive vote.

In sum, we expect that a restrictive policy measure
increases the cost of voting, but also boost the perceived
probability of being decisive. The contrary impact of the
policy on two factors of the voting decision model
makes the regular users’ behavioral change caused by
the policy intervention an empirical question.

3.2. Cost of the policy intervention

4. Research context and data

As described before, our focal policy puts a
restriction on the user activity by limiting the frequency
and volume of the activities. Restricting the volume of
the activities may cause an increase in the opportunity
cost of voting, as it puts votes to become scarce [15].
Also, a ten-second pause increases regular users’ time
cost as they have to spend extra time to participate in the
voting activities. Thus, we first hypothesize that a
platform’s policy to control for the input would increase
the cost of the regular users voting activities.

4.1. Research context

3.3. Perceived probability of being decisive
The policy may also change the perceived
probability of being decisive based on the expected
effectiveness of the policy. Although the extant
literature on election turnout assumes P as ignorable [6,
13], we focus on the perceived probability of being
pivotal for two reasons: first, the online platform
displays the number of upvotes and downvotes in realtime, so that users can predict the importance of their
vote on the outcome. Also, the total number of voters in
our commenting platform is smaller than the number of
voters in political elections, and therefore, we cannot
say that the probability of being decisive is ignorable.
We hypothesize that the policy intervention would
increase the regular users' expectation on the
commenting system efficacy and thus would enhance
the perceived probability of a vote being decisive. The
policy against malicious users will strengthen the belief
that the voice of regular users will be heard and
represented accurately due to the expected decrease of
abusive behaviors in the platform. For this reason,
regular users modify their beliefs on the commenting
system efficacy and thus alter P. If an individual expects
that the policy would effectively reduce the malicious
action, it will increase the perceived probability of
achieving the goal as the total number of votes on a
comment would decrease. Hence, we presume that
policy intervention would effectively increase the
regular users’ perceived probability of their vote being
pivotal. Also, we note that the change in belief would be
heterogeneous across users based on their current
beliefs, past engagement in voting activities, and other
individual characteristics.

This paper utilizes the data provided by one of the
largest online platforms in East Asia. The platform is
similar to Yahoo! Inc. as it offers various online services
including search engine, news, email, entertainment,
finance, shopping, blogs, and online forums. In its news
platform, users can react with comment posting, and
upvote or downvote on comments other users had
posted after reading an article. The platform displays
comments based on the number of netvotes (number of
upvotes – number of downvotes). Comments with the
top five highest netvotes are displayed right below the
news article with a mobile device, and the comments
with the top ten highest netvotes are displayed with a
PC. A screenshot of the commenting system is shown in
Figure 1.
In the focal platform, the most prominent and critical
issue is the political manipulation by clicking "upvote"
or "downvote" buttons on the comments. An ongoing
investigation of the political scandal in Korea revealed
that there had been automated attacks on clicking
upvotes and downvotes in favor of a particular political
camp. Thus, to reduce the manipulative actions of
clicking upvotes and downvotes, the platform
implemented an input control policy on April 25, 2018,
at 11 AM. This policy has two components. First, it
limits the total number of upvotes and downvotes a user
account can perform to 50 per day, and the total number
of comments a user account can write to 3 per article.
Second, it poses a 10-second pause in between clicking
upvotes and downvotes. As the policy aims to reduce the
political manipulation activities, it is only valid for
political news articles.
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Figure 1. A Screenshot of Comments
Displayed in the Platform
The platform had provided multiple announcements
on their policy change. The platform posted an
announcement about this deterrence policy at the top of
the commenting system, as shown in Figure 2A. Also, if
a user tried to vote multiple times with the pause in
between votes less than 10 seconds or vote over 50
times, a popup notice about the deterrence policy is
shown (Figure 2B). Thus, through these
announcements, we assume that users were aware of the
policy implementation.

For this study, we focus on five political news
articles and five non-political news articles that were
posted in the platform's online news portal websites on
April 25, 2018. All the articles were posted before the
implementation of the platform's policy. The focal
articles were selected based on the popularity – the top
5 most viewed political articles and top 5 most viewed
entertainment articles. We create the following two
datasets: The first dataset contains the information about
the comments recorded on the focal articles. After
reading a news article, users can react with comment
posting, and upvote or downvote on comments other
users had posted. A user can upvote or downvote only
once for each comment. The comment data records
fields such as pseudo-id of the comment writer, time the
comment was written, the content of the comment, and
information about people who responded to the
comment including their pseudo-ids, timestamps and
the types of the activities (upvoting or downvoting).
19,541 comments and 308,767 upvote/downvote clicks
were recorded for our ten focal articles. A more detailed
description of the data is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Focal Articles

Political 1
Political 2
Political 3
Political 4
Political 5
Entertainment 1
Entertainment 2
Entertainment 3
Entertainment 4
Entertainment 5

Figure 2. Announcements on capping policy

4.2. Data

Posting
time
4/25/18
9:00
4/25/18
10:15
4/25/18
8:50
4/25/18
9:46
4/25/18
8:47
4/25/18
10:15
4/25/18
8:34
4/25/18
9:05
4/25/18
9:19
4/25/18
9:40

Comment
s

Total
Votes

7,795

127,008

476

7,573

2,178

33,811

793

15,939

3,401

44,786

1,549

31,982

1,538

11,234

1,441

30,264

267

5,743

103

427

The second dataset contains the complete server log
files for users who visited the first political article or the
first entertainment article and spans six hours from 8
AM to 2 PM on April 25, 2018. This dataset records
every activity and request the client (user) makes within
site, including timestamps, URLs the user visited,
referring URLs, types of requests, and browser and
device used. The data contain about 53 million
clickstream records of 680,968 users.
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One interesting aspect of our data is that it enables
us to distinguish abuser accounts from regular users.
The platform identified the accounts that were used for
manipulation activities based on its own detecting
mechanism. It flagged user IDs that had clicked
upvote/downvote more than five times in five minutes
on a comment made under the same IP and cookie
information as malicious accounts. Although these
malicious accounts may not be the full set of the total
abuser accounts, we argue that the detecting mechanism
reasonably locates the accounts that had been involved
in automated actions. Thus, we use the abuser accounts
flagged by the platform to estimate the effect of the
policy in this paper.
Using the first dataset, we construct an individualminute level panel data set that contains individual
voting activities on our ten focal articles. Also, for the
individuals who had visited the first political article and
the first entertainment article (Political 1 and
Entertainment 1), we utilize the second dataset to create
individual-level voting activities before entering the
focal articles.
As mentioned before, the setting of the policy
implementation brings a quasi-experimental design and
allows us to causally inference the effect of policy
implementation on the user activities. To estimate the
impact of platform’s input control policy on the abuser
and user activities, we use difference-in-difference
estimation technique [4, 25]. In order to estimate the
effect of an intervention using the difference-indifference technique, we need observations from a unit
(in this case, individual) in both pre- and post-policy
periods. Therefore, we select users who visited both preand post-policy. We also limit the time bandwidth to 30
minutes before and after the policy implementation to
screen out the unobservables that could affect the voting
behavior. We exclude individuals who visited both the
focal political and entertainment articles from our
sample, as they may have been exposed to the
platform’s policy and thus their behavior afterward may
be affected by the policy even in the entertainment
articles.
In sum, our final sample includes 63,697 individualminute level observations from 5,781 individuals.
Among the individuals in the sample, about 5.2% of the
accounts were identified as abusers. Summary statistics
of the data is presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Panel A – Number of Individuals in Each Group
Control

Treatment

User

1,973

3,506

Abuser

26

276

Panel B - Summary Statistics
Mean

S. Dev

Min

Max

Ind(Treatment)

0.6377

0.4807

0

1

Ind(Post-Policy)

0.5123

0.4999

0

1

Ind(Abuser)

0.0779

0.2680

0

1

Log(activity+1)

0.1065

0.4160

0

3.9512

# Obs

63,697

5. Empirical analysis and results
5.1. Difference-in-difference-in-difference
5.1.1. Difference-in-difference-in-difference. We
begin our empirical analysis by aiming to examine
whether the impact of the policy varies on abusers and
regular users. In order to estimate the effect, we use the
difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD)
specification. The DDD estimate of policy intervention
is estimated by:
(1) 𝑌"# = 𝛼" + 𝜆# + 𝛿* 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" + 𝛿0 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" ×
𝐴𝑏" + 𝜃𝑋"# + 𝜀"# ,
where 𝛼" is an individual fixed effect and 𝜆# is a time
fixed effect in minute level. Same as our previous
equation, our dependent variable 𝑌"# is log(number of
total votes+1) an individual i performed at minute t.
𝑃𝑜𝑙# is a post-policy indicator. It is equal to 1 if t is
greater than the policy implementation. 𝑇" is an
indicator for the individuals in the treatment group people who had visited political articles. 𝑋"# controls for
the focal articles each individual i was active on at
minute t. 𝐴𝑏" is an abuser indicator - 1 if an individual i
is marked as an abuser by the platform. From the above
specification, our difference-in-difference coefficient
𝛿* captures the effect of the platform’s policy on user
activities in the focal ten articles while 𝛿* + 𝛿0 captures
the effect of the platform’s policy on abuser activities in
the focal ten articles.
One potential issue with the above specification in
equation (1) is that it does not account for the difference
in duration of the focal article visits each individual has.
Users visit the focal article at a different time and the
length of their stay in the focal article is also different.
If there exist time trends based on the duration of the
users, the previous model would not capture it. To
handle this issue, we include individual-specific linear
time trends:
(2) 𝑌"# = 𝛼" + 𝜆# + 𝛿* 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" + 𝛿0 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" ×
𝐴𝑏" + 𝛽𝑋"# + 𝜃" 𝜏 + 𝜀"#
where τ equals 1 if an individual i entered into the focal
article and linearly increases by each minute. Here,
𝜃" controls the linear individual time trend. In other
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words, we allow each individual to have different linear
time trend after controlling for the individual and time
fixed effects.
Results from equation (1) are presented in Table 3
column (1) and the results from equation (2) are
presented in Table 3 column (2). As can be seen from
both specifications, the policy implementation is
significantly and positively correlated with the total
number of voting for the regular users but negatively
correlated with the voting activities of the abusers. The
results under equation (2) suggest that the policy
increases the regular user voting activities by 2.2%
while decreasing the voting activities of the abusers by
1.8%. This result implies that 1) the capping policy
effectively restricts the behavior of the abusers, 2)
expected utility under the policy outweighs the cost
imposed by the policy for the regular users. As
explained in our theoretical framework, it may occur
from the increase in the perceived probability that user’s
voting activities would better represent their opinion in
the commenting system. This change in the perceived
probability mainly comes from the expected decline in
the abusive actions under the policy.
Table 3. Results from DDD models
Dependent
Variable

Controls

(1)
Ln(vote+1)
0.0156 ***
(0.0059)
-.0590 ***
(0.0111)
YES

(2)
Ln(vote+1)
0.0219 **
(0.0099)
-0.0405 **
(0.0186)
YES

Observations

63,697

63,697

R-Squared

0.4939

0.5803

Individual FE

YES

YES

Minute FE

YES

YES

NO

LINEAR

𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇"
𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" × 𝐴𝑏"

Individual Trend

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.1.2. Heterogeneous effect by previous voting
activities. Our results indicate that the change in
expected utility under the policy outweighs the cost
imposed by the policy for the regular users. It may occur
from the change in the perceived probability that voting
activities would better promote their opinion without the
abusers. We examine further by dividing the regular
users into two, one with previous voting activities and
the other without previous voting activities. We argue
that users who have been engaged in the voting activities
have a better understanding of the magnitude of the
malicious actions and have stronger beliefs on the
accountability of the commenting system. Thus, we

expect that the restrictive policy will reinforce the
activities of regular users with previous voting
activities.
To test our hypothesis, we create an indicator
variable based on the voting activities before they visit
our focal articles. As we only have information about
the previous activities for the individuals who had
visited the first political article and the first
entertainment article (Political 1 and Entertainment 1),
we limit our sample to these individuals. Also, as our
goal for the analysis is to see the heterogeneous policy
effect among the regular users, we exclude the
individuals marked as abusers. Thus, our new sample
for the analysis contains 34,108 individual-minute level
observations from 3,689 regular users.
We first estimate the effect of policy on the users
separately based on the previous activities using
difference-in-difference:
(3) 𝑌"# = 𝛼" + 𝜆# + 𝛿* 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" + 𝜀"# ,
where 𝛼" is an individual fixed effect and 𝜆# is a time
fixed effect in minute level. Again, our dependent
variable 𝑌"# is log (number of total votes+1) an
individual i performed at minute t. 𝑃𝑜𝑙# is a post-policy
indicator. It is equal to 1 if t is greater than the policy
implementation. 𝑇" is an indicator for the individuals in
the treatment group. We divide our sample into two, one
containing observations from the users without any
previous activities and the other with observations from
users with previous activities, and estimate using
equation (3).
We also estimate the heterogeneous effect by users’
previous activities using difference-in-difference-indifference estimation similar to equation (1):
(4) 𝑌"# = 𝛼" + 𝜆# + 𝛿* 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" + 𝛿0 𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇" ×
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒" + 𝜀"# ,
where 𝛼" is an individual fixed effect and 𝜆# is a time
fixed effect in minute level. Same as our previous
equation, our dependent variable 𝑌"# is log (number of
total votes+1) an individual i performed at minute t.
𝑃𝑜𝑙# is a post-policy indicator. It is equal to 1 if t is
greater than the policy implementation. 𝑇" is an
indicator for the individuals in the treatment group, that
is, people that had visited political articles. 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒" _i
indicates for the users’ previous activities, where the
indicator equals 1 if an individual i had been engaged in
voting behavior before he/she visited our focal articles
and 0 if an individual i had no previous activities.
Table 4 shows the result from equation (3) and (4).
Results on Table 4 column (1) and (2) show that the
policy intervention increases voting activities of the
overall users, regardless of their previous voting
behavior. Results on Table 4 column (3) directly
compare the impact of the policy intervention on users
with previous voting experience and without previous
voting experience. We can see that users who had been
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engaged in voting activities before the focal article show
greater increase in the number of voting after the
treatment, and thus the results support our hypothesis
that more attentive users are more likely to have a
greater perception change in probability of voting a
decisive vote.
Table 4. Results of
heterogeneous policy effects
Sample

(1)
W/O
activity
0.0095 **
(0.0047)

(2)
With
activity
0.0645 ***
(0.0247)

(3)
All sample

𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇"
× 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖
Controls

-

-

YES

YES

0.0081
(0.0063)
0.0578 ***
(0.0099)
YES

Obs.

27,828

6,280

34,108

R-Squared
Individual
FE
Minute FE

0.4106

0.4227

0.4451

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

𝑃𝑜𝑙# × 𝑇"

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5.2. Random Utility Model

Results from DDD models show strong evidence
that policy intervention induces regular users’
behavioral changes. However, it has two limitations: the
sample used in the DDD analysis is limited as we only
include limited bandwidth of the time and individuals
who had been engaged in voting activities during preand post-treatment periods. Also, it is still uncertain of
what drove the behavioral changes of regular users. To
overcome this issue, we propose a random utility model
based on our conceptual framework described in Section
3.
5.2.1. Revisiting calculus of voting. To empirically
examine the impact of restrictive policy on the regular
users’ voting decisions, we revisit the rational voting
model mentioned in the previous section:
(5) 𝑈"? = 𝑃"? × 𝐵"? + 𝐷" − 𝐶"? ,
where i indicates individual and c indicates comment.
Again, an individual’s utility for voting a comment
comes from the probability of one’s vote being decisive
𝑃"? , benefit from the comment being promoted/demoted
𝐵"? , satisfaction from voting 𝐷" and the cost of voting
𝐶"? . Unlike traditional elections, users in our context can
vote only once per comment (upvote or downvote) and
can vote across multiple comments. Thus, we assume
that an individual has a different level of utility per
comment.

In our model, P is defined as a function of closeness,
following the operationalization of Riker and
Ordeshook (1968). We develop a closeness measure as
the difference in netvotes between a comment and a
comment ranked next [19]. As the platform displays
comments based on the number of netvotes, this
measure reflects the closeness of winning (moving to
the upper ranking). When a user clicks a news article,
the comments and the number of netvotes displayed
below the article do not change unless the user refreshes
the webpage. Thus, this variable varies by the individual
user’s time of arrival to the focal article.
We also include a policy indicator in our model. We
code 1 if an individual i engaged in a voting activity on
comment c under the policy intervention and 0
otherwise. And we include an interaction term of policy
indicator and closeness to empirically examine the
impact of the capping policy on the perceived
probability of being influential on the outcome.
5.2.2. Random utility model. Drawing upon a random
utility model, we rewrite the previous equation as:
(6) 𝑈"? = 𝛽𝑋" + 𝛼𝑍? + 𝛿𝑇"? + 𝜀"? ,
where 𝑈"? is the ith individual’s expected utility of
voting on comment c, 𝑋" represents individual-level
variables, 𝑍? represents comment-level variables, and
𝑇"? represents the variable of interest: closeness and
policy indicator.
Our observed outcome, 𝑦"? , represents the voting
activity of an individual i on comment c and takes either
one or zero. If a user had voted to the comment, 𝑦"?
takes a value of 1, and 0 of one had not voted to the
comment. Assuming a latent regression determines the
observed outcome variable, we have a probability model
of voting:
(7) Pr(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 = 1|𝑋" , 𝑍? , 𝑇"? ) = Pr (𝜀"? > −(𝛽𝑋" +
𝛼𝑍? + 𝛿𝑇"? ))
Using a simple linear probability model, we estimate
the above equation and provide initial evidence for the
validity of our conceptual model. We employ commentlevel fixed effects in terms of 𝑍? and individual-level
fixed effects and individual’s arrival time dummies (in
30 minute interval) for 𝑋" . In our context, users can
either upvote or downvote a comment but both, so we
estimate the propensity of up-voting and down-voting,
respectively. Further, we argue that ranking of the
comment has an inevitable effect on user’s decision to
vote, due to the platform’s design factor. Therefore, we
also estimate the above equations separately by the
ranking of each comment. We utilize the netvote
distance from the ith ranked comment to the i-1th ranked
comment as the closeness in the upvote estimation, and
the netvote distance from the ith ranked comment to the
i+1th ranked comment as the closeness in the downvote
estimation. In the case of first-ranked comment, we

Page 3988

utilize the netvote distance to the second-ranked
comment for both upvote and downvote analysis. We
also include inverse ranking as a control variable in the
full-sample analysis, and user’s previous voting counts
and their device as controls in the analysis by ranking.
To estimate the equation (7), we create a sample
based on our second dataset. We include all the regular
users who have visited political 1 article. As explained
before, users with PC see 10 comments below the article
and users with mobile devices see 5 comments below
the article. Therefore, we include 5 individual-comment
level observations for the mobile device users and 10
individual-comment level observations for the PC users.
The sample includes 2,282,672 observations from
438,889 users.
Table 5. Results from RUM
Panel A : DV=Upvote
Closeness
All
All
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Rank 5

-.0000003
(0.000000)
.00000008
(0.0000004)
-.000002
(0.0000049)
.0000051*
(0.0000026)
.000005**
(0.0000024)
-.000022***
(0.000007)
-.0000036
(0.000002)

Policy
0.59701***
(0.004154)
0.59718***
(0.00415)
0.77219***
(0.03407)
0.62057***
(0.01368)
0.75085***
(0.01452)
0.69746***
(0.01874)
0.51897***
(0.01415)

Closeness×
Policy

-.0000007*
(0.0000004)
-0.000074
(0.0000661)
-.000128***
(0.000018)
-.000227***
(0.00002)
-.000258***
(0.000079)
.000204***
(0.000032)

Panel B : DV=Downvote
Closeness
All
All
Rank 1
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Rank 5

.0000007***
(0.000000)
.0000003
(0.0000002)
-.0000052**
(0.000002)
.0000014
(0.0000017)
-.0000009
(0.0000014)
.00000093
(0.000001)
-.0000008
(0.0000008)

Policy
0.24573***
(0.00248)
0.24551***
(0.002483)
0.17130***
(0.01472)
0.29541***
(0.007994)
0.13142***
(0.00638)
0.14457***
(0.00648)
0.21524***
(0.00653)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Closeness×
Policy

.0000006***
(0.0000002)
-.000072**
(0.000029)
-.0000086
(0.000013)
0.00007**
(0.000027)
-.000057***
(0.000014)
0.000011***
(0.000004)

Table 5 reports results from 7 separate analysis
based on equation (7). As mentioned before, panel A
uses upvote as the dependent variable, and panel B uses
downvote as the dependent variable. In upvoting
decisions, we can see from column (3) that as netvote
distance from the focal comment to the comment ranked
above gets smaller, regular users are more likely to vote
‘like’ after the policy implementation in the most
analysis. Also, by comparing the estimates of the main
effect and the interaction effect, we support our
theoretical model that users are more likely to vote when
the distance between the focal comment and the
previous comment gets smaller, that is, one’s vote
becomes more decisive. In the analysis of ranking 5, we
find a contrary effect. Although more investigation is
needed, we suspect that it is due to the platform’s
commenting system design, that only the top five
comments are seen in the news article page without any
clicks.
In the downvote analysis, the results are not easily
explainable. Some of the interaction estimates are
positive, while the others are negative. There may be
several explanations: First, the underlying mechanism
of the voting decision may be different in the ‘disliking’
situation as the traditional voting decision framework
we employ focuses on the voting decision in the
elections – more similar to ‘liking’ the candidate than
‘disliking’. Second, in this initial study, we do not
control for the valence of the comments and the users,
and these may have a more significant effect on
downvotes than the upvotes.

6. Conclusion and Implications
With the growing attention on online manipulation,
many online platforms have imposed or considering to
impose the policies to control malicious behavior. This
paper plans to empirically examine the efficacy of the
online platform's policy measure to meaningful
behavioral changes of abusers and regular users,
respectively. Our results show that the policy has an
asymmetric effect on abusive users and regular users –
while it effectively reduces the actions of the abusers by
1.8%, it promotes the activities of the regular users by
2.2%. We also find that the policy increases the
activities of the regular users, regardless of their
previous voting activities. We also draw from rational
voting decision theory and show some initial evidence
that the capping policy reinforces the perceived
probability of being influential on the outcome in the
upvote actions.
Our results add to the current literature of fake
information and online opinion manipulation and the
effectiveness of the platform’s input policies to restrain
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the manipulative activities on the regular user. To the
extent, reports from the social network platforms and
popular press have documented the potential negative
consequences of such a restrictive policy on the users'
activities. However, our results and findings indicate
that the platform's simple input control policy
suppresses only the activities of the abusers and instead
increases the activities of the regular users. Further, our
research applies the voting decision framework to the
online user behavior by empirically investigating the
voting activities in the online political news platform.
Online voting has an interesting feature—real-time
display of closeness—and thus this study will provide
new insights on the impact of closeness on voting
decisions on online platforms where a voter can observe
their actual closeness measure at the time of their voting
decision.
This research also provides meaningful managerial
implications. Our results show that an activity-capping
policy may be an alternative to abuser detection and
suspension for many online communicating platforms,
review sites and news platforms utilizing users votes on
the popularity of the contents, Capping policy reduces
abusers’ influence on public opinion by inducing more
participation from the regular users. This study shows
that a simple, easily implementable deterrence policy
can mitigate abusive actions while promoting user
discussion and opinion exchanges on the online news
platforms.
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